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ABSTRACT
Pyramidal Ownership in Ecuadorian Business Groups.
(May 2009)
María L. Granda Kuffó, B.A., Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral; 
M.S., Universidad de Chile
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Steve Wiggins
The purpose of this research is to explore the motivation of business group firms 
to adopt pyramidal ownership structures. The traditional approach claims that pyramids 
are useful in tunneling resources to other affiliates by transferring value to firms with 
high cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Using a unique dataset of 7,180 
Ecuadorian firms, I analyze the transmission of profits’ shocks among group firms to
assess the existence and the amount of tunneling. The comprehensive ownership 
information allows me to identify pyramidal and horizontally owned group firms 
separately and better understand the nature of their ownership structure. The results 
provide support for the existence of tunneling in Ecuadorian business groups. About 
70% of the profits of the average group firm are transferred to another affiliate, although 
only half of this money shows up on its books.
An alternative explanation for the flow of money among group firms is the 
existence of internal capital markets to substitute for imperfections in the external 
market. I test this hypothesis by comparing the impact of cash flow availability in the 
investment decision of group firms with that of stand-alone firms. Group firms’ cash 
flow to investment sensitivity appears to be only half of the value for comparable stand-
alone firms. Moreover, group liquidity is also a determinant of the average group firm’s 
investment, especially for pyramidal firms.
iv
The analysis sheds light on the nature of business groups in Latin America, their 
ownership patterns, and their resource allocation decisions.
vDEDICATION
This work is dedicated to my parents, Esther and Luis, who always encouraged
me to pursue my dreams.
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to recognize the chair of my committee Prof. Steve Wiggins for his 
invaluable guidance and support, not only in my formation as an economist but also, and 
mostly, in my formation as a person. I also recognize the helpful advice of all the 
members of my committee, Prof. Li Gan, Prof. Steve Puller and Prof. Laszlo Tihanyi. I 
appreciate the continuous support and trust of my sponsors, Escuela Superior Politécnica 
del Litoral (ESPOL) and Comisión Fulbright del Ecuador. I would like to thank Tom 
Swanner for the help and expertise of in the procurement the dataset. I am also indebted 
to all my colleagues, especially Courtney Collins, Manuel Hernandez, and Noelia Paez,
for their help and encouragement. And last but not least, I am grateful to my family:
Guillermo, who gave me the first impulse to start this project, and Nicolas, who grew up 
with me throughout the whole process.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Page
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................. iii
DEDICATION .......................................................................................................... v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................... vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... vii
LIST OF FIGURES................................................................................................... ix
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................... x
CHAPTER
I INTRODUCTION……........................................................................ 1
II LITERATURE REVIEW.....................................................................       8
III DATA AND BACKGROUND............................................................      17
Ecuadorian business groups ...........................................................      17
Data and statistics...........................................................................      20
IV THE TUNNELING HYPOTHESIS..................................................... 29
                       Methodology ................................................................................. 29  
Exogeneity of business group affiliation........................................ 32    
Results ...........................................................................................      36
V THE INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS HYPOTHESIS.................. 43
Methodology ..................................................................................       43
Results ............................................................................................       47
VI        CONCLUSIONS..................................................................................       53
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................      55
APPENDIX A ...........................................................................................................       60     
viii
Page
APPENDIX B ........................................................................................................... 62
APPENDIX C ........................................................................................................... 64
APPENDIX D ........................................................................................................... 65
APPENDIX E............................................................................................................ 68
VITA ......................................................................................................................... 70
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE    Page
1 Pyramidal structure ..................................................................................      62
2 Horizontal structure .................................................................................. 62
3 An actual pyramid in Ecuadorian business groups…............................... 63
xLIST OF TABLES
TABLE                                                                                                                          Page
1 Statistics for the relevant sample ...................................................... 22
2 Pyramidal firm’s characterization .................................................... 25
3 Firm’s characteristics by pyramid level ........................................... 27
4 Differential sensitivity of group shock ............................................ 37
5 Sensitivity to shock of others in the group........................................ 39
6 Are firms sensitive to shocks of others at the bottom? ..................... 40
7 Are higher up firms more sensitive to shocks of lower down?......... 41
8 Investment to cash flow sensitivity differential group vs. non-group 49
9 Investment to cash flow sensitivity including the cash flow of 
others in the group............................................................................. 51
D.1 Probability of group affiliation ......................................................... 65
D.2 Spearman rank correlation matrix .................................................... 65
D.3 Instrumental variables estimation results .......................................... 66
D.4 Endogenous switching regression model .......................................... 67
      E.1 Investment to cash flow sensitivity by category group-affiliation     
(dynamic panel) with lagged sales growth as control ....................... 68
E.2  Investment to cash flow sensitivity by category group-affiliation 
(dynamic panel) with lagged ROA as control….…………………...      69
1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Business groups are corporate organizations common to many economies. They 
frequently adopt pyramidal ownership structures, which are complex networks of 
shareholding among firms that belong to the same family or related party. The question I 
will address in this research project regards the motivation of firms to organize as 
pyramids. Specifically, I will assess the extent to which firms in business groups use 
these structures to transfer value from minority to controlling shareholders, or to provide 
financing through an internal market.
The role that business groups play, particularly for the case of developing 
economies, has attracted many researchers to study these organizations. A wide range of 
questions have been addressed, including the origin of business groups, the differences 
in performance compared to stand-alone firms, the incentives that groups shareholders
face, and the impact that they cause in the markets they operate.  One particular question 
that arises from the empirical grounds concerns the commonly observed pyramidal 
ownership structure. Why are these complicated structures helpful to stockholders? 
Several hypotheses have emerged to explain the existence of pyramids. Among 
the most commonly cited are the tunneling hypothesis and the internal capital markets 
hypothesis. They both predict the existence of money flows among pyramidal firms but                                                              
________________________
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2differ in the nature of the shareholders’ motivation and hence, in the economic 
implications. Additionally, the co-insurance and the tax avoidance hypotheses are related 
explanations that are out of the scope of this study. Each of these theories has received 
attention in recent studies, which have provided theoretical, empirical, and anecdotal 
support for them. 
The tunneling hypothesis has been widely studied under the argument of 
separation between ownership and control. According to this hypothesis, business 
groups use pyramids to gain control of numerous companies with a reduced level of 
ownership and cash flow rights. A pyramidal structure generates incentives for the 
controlling shareholders to redirect money from firms where their cash flow rights are 
low to those with higher ones. This practice is called tunneling and is considered illegal 
in many countries because of the agency problems it generates. 
An alternative view of the existence of pyramids concerns the use of internal 
capital markets, originated by the severe limitations in developing economies, 
particularly in the access to external capital markets and the elevated costs of credit. 
Business groups are able to overcome these difficulties through the reallocation of 
resources among affiliated firms. That is, group firms may be providing funding to better
projects, resulting in a more efficient use of resources while at the same time avoiding 
information problems that are present in the capital market. Stand-alone firms are not 
able to take advantage of this benefit.
The co-insurance hypothesis is somewhat related to the tunneling hypothesis, but 
in the former, the main motivation for the flow of resources through a pyramid is to 
3temporarily bail out firms by injecting capital to prevent them from going bankrupt. This 
practice is often referred as “propping out” and may be beneficial to minority 
shareholders, unlike tunneling, because controlling shareholders transfer value from 
presumably sound projects to bad prospects. The final theory, the tax avoidance 
hypothesis, has received little attention in the corporate governance literature. According 
to this hypothesis, the pyramidal structure allows groups to shift income or assets out of 
high tax jurisdictions into low tax jurisdictions, such as tax havens. 
This paper focuses on the study of the tunneling hypothesis and the internal 
capital market hypothesis for the case of Ecuadorian business groups. While I do not 
reject the validity of the tunneling hypothesis and its implications, several facts point out 
the relevance of the internal capital markets hypothesis for this case. First, capital market 
imperfections affect the availability and costs of financing in this developing economy. 
Second, as a result of underdeveloped stock markets firms have to rely on alternatives 
sources of funding such as debt or internal resources to finance their projects. Finally the 
internal capital markets view is consistent with group ownership patterns and incentives 
in Ecuadorian firms.
This research contributes to the business groups’ literature in two key aspects. 
First, the richness of the ownership data allows me to test several hypotheses with more 
accuracy than before. I am able to separate group firms that belong to pyramids from 
those that do not. Most of the previous work has assumed that all firms in groups were 
organized as pyramids, while this may not be the case.1 Moreover, by identifying the 
                                                          
1 In my data, about 50% of the set of group firms belong to pyramids.
4exact position of firms in the pyramid I can test for the existence of tunneling with this 
observed ranking instead of using family cash flow rights to proxy for firm’s level. 
Second, a direct test of the internal capital markets hypothesis is constructed by taking 
advantage of the variation in stand-alone, group, and pyramidal firms’ liquidity and its 
impact in the decision to invest. Additionally, I evaluate whether or not business group 
and pyramidal ownership observed patterns are consistent with the theoretical 
predictions of Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006). 
The economy under study is Ecuador. This small open economy has gone 
through recent major economical and political reforms. Following a financial crisis that 
resulted in hyperinflation, in 2000 the economy abandoned its domestic currency to 
officially adopt the US dollar as a mean of exchange. These changes have affected the 
environment where companies operate as well as the incentives they face. Additionally, 
political instability has not been helpful to the economic conditions, particularly in the 
financial market. Business group firms represent a large fraction of the economy2 and 
have drawn attention, due to the allegedly close connections of financial institutions and 
politicians. These links have even been argued as a major cause of the banking sector 
crisis, making it crucial to understand the role groups play in this economy. 
Additionally, the Ecuadorian Internal Revenue Service developed a list of business 
groups and its associates with the goal of tracing tax avoidance among these firms. 
                                                          
2 Morck and Yeung (2003) claim that most large firms in Ecuador and other countries are organized as 
business groups controlled by a few wealthy families. “Firms controlled by the Noboa family provide the 
incomes of about three million of Ecuador’s eleven million people. The family’s banana operations alone, 
which account for 40% of Ecuador’s banana exports, generate about 5% of the country’s GDP.” From De 
Cordoba, J. Heirs battle over empire in Ecuador. Wall Street Journal, December 20, 1995.
5Although this work does not study the tax avoidance hypothesis directly, the current 
analysis could shed some light on the issue, especially for policy design purposes.
While it is difficult to empirically distinguish among the different hypotheses that 
explain pyramids, their relevance is irrefutable. Understanding the motivation for the 
flow of resources within a business group is helpful to determine its economic 
implications. Tunneling is a major concern for minority shareholders who are exposed to 
losses in shares’ value, reducing the incentives to invest and dampening the development 
of capital markets. Another consequence of pyramids is that they facilitate the 
entrenchment of families or controlling shareholders in the management. In contrast, 
business groups and pyramids may provide their affiliates with an internal capital market 
that is more efficient than the external. The main advantage of this implication is a 
reduction in information asymmetries and transaction costs for the firms. In each case 
the policy implications would be different.3 Nevertheless, social welfare implications of 
pyramids are hard to assess. 
I rely on the methodology of Bertrand et al. (2002), who track the flow of money 
through a pyramid by generating shocks and analyzing their transmission through a 
pyramid. The hypotheses are constructed in terms of certain flow patterns that should be 
observed if the motivation for the flow of resources was tunneling. Mainly, they argue 
that resources flow from the bottom to the top of the pyramid, under the assumption that 
controlling shareholders rank firms in the pyramid according to their level of cash flow 
                                                          
3 Khanna and Yafeh (2007) discuss whether business groups should be considered paragons or parasites 
according to these two disputing hypotheses.
6rights. I apply this method to test for the existence of tunneling using a dataset of 
Ecuadorian firms. 
To provide some insights for the internal capital markets hypothesis I use the 
investment to cash flow relationship, which is a widely used empirical device in the field 
of corporate finance. The original purpose of this tool is to test for the existence of 
financial constraints as in Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1987) and Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997). The application to business groups focuses on the assessment of the 
impact of the firm’s own liquidity as well as the liquidity of group members in the 
investment decisions of this firm.
The results provide some support for the tunneling hypothesis. On average, the 
profits of group firms respond less to a shock than the profits of comparable stand-alone 
firms, resulting in about only 17% of the expected change in profits showing up in the 
books for group members. Moreover, group firms appear to significantly respond to the 
shock of other members of the same group, although some profits seem to be dissipated 
in the process. This result supports both hypotheses without being able to separately 
identify the effects. The results for the internal capital markets hypothesis provide 
support for a differential sensitivity of investment to cash flow between group and stand-
alone firms. That is, financial constraints may exist in the case of the Ecuadorian 
economy encouraging the development of internal capital markets within business 
groups in search of a more efficient capital allocation. 
The document is organized as follows. The next chapter presents a literature 
review on business groups and pyramidal ownership. Chapter III presents some 
7background information on Ecuadorian business groups and describes the dataset.  
Chapter IV discusses some methodological issues and the empirical strategy I follow to 
investigate the tunneling hypothesis, followed by the results with a special discussion of 
the endogeneity of group ownership. Chapter V provides support for the alternative 
explanation, the internal capital markets hypothesis followed by some concluding 
remarks. 
8CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
In a seminal paper, Leff (1978) defines a business group as “a group of 
companies that does business in different markets under common administrative or 
financial control, whose members are linked by relations of interpersonal trust on the 
bases of similar personal, ethnic or commercial background”. The importance of 
business groups around the world has been noticed under a different set of questions that 
arise, including agency problems (Jensen (1986), Claessens et al. (2000)); monopoly 
power and entry (Feenstra et al. (2003), Cestone and Fumagalli (2005)); 
macroeconomic implications and relation to financial crisis (Mitton (2002), Lemmon 
and Lins (2003), Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005)); tax policy (Morck (2004)); 
political connections (Fisman (2001), Johnson and Mitton (2003)).
The ownership structure adopted by business groups is believed to play a key 
role on the performance of these organizations4. At the same time, there are different 
motivations for the complex ownership patterns and legal arrangements that groups 
follow, such as pyramids and cross holdings. For instance, Claessens and Tzioumis
(2006) argue that the ownership structure is linked to the performance and development 
of business groups through the legal foundations and institutional framework of the 
country, and more specifically, of the corporate governance. They also discuss the 
importance of the high levels of ownership concentration leading to capital allocation 
                                                          
4 Additionally, recent literature acknowledges and assesses the possibility that group firms’ expected value 
maybe determining the ownership patterns of business groups. See for instance Almeida et al. (2008).
9distortions that permit families to influence the development of public policy and 
institutions.
Morck et al. (2004) show the evolution of large pyramidal corporate groups 
controlled by wealthy families into widely held firms and the reversal to pyramidal and 
highly concentrated ownership in Canada along the 20th century. They suggest that 
institutional factors must have caused this phenomena and favor the literature that argues 
the ability of business groups to influence government policy design. 
One of the most commonly argued implication of business groups ownership 
structure is the transfer of resources among group firms. This is the focus of this 
research, particularly under the case of pyramidal ownership structures. Specifically I 
address the two hypotheses that have led the discussion: the tunneling hypothesis and the 
internal capital market hypothesis.
The tunneling hypothesis is the more traditional view, based on the idea that 
pyramids are instruments for the separation of ownership and control. It poses an agency 
problem between controlling shareholders (usually a family5) and minority shareholders, 
since the former is able to control all the firms in the pyramid without being entitled to 
most of these firms’ cash flow. In a weak legal and institutional system, there is a great 
                                                          
5 There is an extensive literature on family firms. See for instance a compilation in the Handbook of 
Research on Family Business, like Westhead and Howorth (2006), and Poutziouris (2006), who 
empirically document the relation between family dynamics and family firms’ performance. Particular 
attention has been put on the effects of founder’s control versus heirs’ control, the importance of 
succession issues, among others. Also on this issue, Villalonga and Amit (2006) claim that ownership 
structure determines firm performance and value. They find that family ownership creates value only 
when the founder serves as CEO of the family firm. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is 
destroyed. They derive several conclusions about the costs of different principal-agent relationships in 
these firms. These results apply to family business groups; although this is not the focus of this research.
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risk of expropriation of minority shareholders, since the value of a firm is diminished by 
the transfer of income or assets towards firms in which families have more at stake.
There is a growing stream of literature that supports this hypothesis. 
Bertrand et al. (2002) develop a methodology to track the amount of tunneling 
through a pyramid. They find evidence that supports the existence of tunneling in Indian 
business groups, and describe certain flow patterns that profits follow. They assess the
response of pyramidal firms’ earnings to industry shocks, and conclude that business 
group firms’ under-response is the amount of tunneling. On average, the increase in 
profits in response to a shock is much lower for group firms; in the case of the Indian 
economy about 30% of the profits placed into a group firm are dissipated. They argue 
that money flows from firms located in the base of the pyramid since these firms’
earnings appear to be less sensitive to shocks in their industries. Also, tunneling appears 
to take place mostly through the non-operating components of profits. In conclusion, the 
article proposes a basic methodology that is used here as the test for tunneling in the 
Ecuadorian economy. It will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV.
Following a different approach, Bae, Kang and Kim (2002) find evidence of 
tunneling in a sample of Korean business group firms. They analyze the changes in stock 
prices for chaebol affiliated firms at the time a group member makes an acquisition. 
They find that while the value of the acquiring firm drops, the group as a whole benefit 
from the merger, by an increase in the value of other group firms and the controlling 
shareholders’ wealth. While the structure of Indian groups differs from that of Korean 
chaebols, they are still able to find support for the tunneling hypothesis.
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In a similar fashion Baek, Kang and Lee (2006) examine in more detail the 
channels through which tunneling occurs. They focus on the financing decisions rather 
than on the investment decisions of group firms. They analyze the pricing and valuation 
effect of equity-linked private security offerings by Korean firms from 1989 to 2000, 
establishing a relation between firm’s value and tunneling incentives. They conclude that 
inefficient financing decisions are made. For instance, chaebols could issue poor 
performing firms securities at inflated prices and have better performing firms in the 
same group acquire them. 
Johnson, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer (2000) present anecdotal 
evidence of tunneling in Europe. They focus in the legal and financial development 
aspects of tunneling. According to their findings tunneling occurs not only in developing 
economies but also in economies with effective law enforcement. They conclude that 
groups make use of several mechanisms under legal arrangements in order to benefit the 
controlling party and destroying firm value for minority shareholders. 
The alternative hypothesis under study suggests the existence of pyramids as a 
mechanism that facilitates the use of internal capital markets, in contrast with the 
traditional view. That is, while tunneling creates a serious friction that affects the 
efficient functioning of the capital market, the use of the internal capital market may lead 
to an efficiency improvement when the external capital market fails. This happens 
through the allocation of group resources to other members, adding value to the firm and 
the group. This possibility gives business group firms an advantage over stand-alone 
firms in terms of reduced transaction costs and information asymmetries. 
12
The internal capital market hypothesis stresses the importance of certain 
organizations such as business groups’ appearance as a response to a weak institutional 
environment; see for instance Khanna and Palepu (2000). They propose corporate 
groups as a second best solution in economies whose product, labor, and capital markets 
are underdeveloped and inefficient. Substantial evidence of this fact has been provided 
in the case of developing economies. It is often argued that this advantage is one of the 
sources of better performance of group firms when compared to stand-alone firms. 
However, critics of this assumption6 claim that the use of internal capital markets may be 
even more harmful to the economy as a whole. According to this view, groups act in 
their own interest and, in some cases, their business decision making process fits family
purposes more than business objectives. In such cases, they may damage minority 
shareholders, new entrepreneurs, and society in general.
To empirically test this hypothesis, a general tool is available from the corporate 
finance literature. The investment to cash flow sensitivity relationship has been widely 
used to assess the existence of financial constraints. The seminal paper by Fazzari, 
Hubbard, and Petersen (1987) tests the pecking order theory of financing costs7, which 
states that liquidity is a determinant of a firm’s investment in the absence of perfect 
capital markets. They argue that the investment decision of financially constrained 
firms8 is sensitive to the availability of their own cash flow. In contrast, non-financially 
constrained firms show significantly lower or no sensitivity to cash flow changes. This 
                                                          
6 See for example Morck et al. (2004). 
7 Originally introduced by Modigliani and Miller (1958).
8 In the finance literature financially constrained firms are those with permanent higher costs of, and 
restricted access to external financing.
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study highlights the implications of the differential costs of external vs. internal finance, 
such as the underinvestment of firms that have no access to internal finance. 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) develop a critique of Fazzari et al. arguing that their 
definition of financially constrained firms, which is based on dividend payment policy, 
is flawed. They claim that the criteria that Fazzari et al. use to define the subsamples are 
not adequate measures of financial constraint. They redefine the subsamples according 
to the availability and demand for funds of the firms and find results contradicting those 
of Fazzari.
Following these studies, several attempts have been made to assess the 
importance of financial constraints for real variables. For instance, Lamont (1997) 
analyzes the investment decision of non-oil subsidiaries of oil companies. He uses an 
exogenous shock that decreased oil price to take care of the potential endogeneity of 
liquidity in the investment equation. The results show that oil companies reduced the 
investment in non-oil division compared to the median industry investment, implying 
that before the shock they were financed by more profitable units of the company. These 
results support the existence of internal capital markets. 
Similarly, Shin and Stulz (1998) assess the efficiency of internal capital markets 
with a sample of Compustat firms’ segments9. They assume that if the internal capital 
market functions perfectly, then investment by a segment in a diversified firm should 
depend only on its investment opportunities, not on its cash flow, and only firm-level 
cash flow should matter. They find evidence that the internal capital market is active but 
                                                          
9 This introduces a difficulty in computing Tobin’s q to measure investment opportunities for segments, 
since this variable is usually available at the firm level. 
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imperfect. Basically, investment by a segment of a diversified firm depends on the cash 
flow of the firm’s other segments, but less than on its own cash flow. The sensitivity of a 
segment’s investment to the cash flow of other segments does not depend on whether its 
investment opportunities are better than those of the firm’s other segments, suggesting
that resource allocation is inefficient.
Business group firms permit an analysis of the existence of internal capital 
markets with an advantage over the use of firms’ segments. Since business groups are 
related through ownership and control, they can be defined a priori as a less financially 
constrained segment than stand-alone firms in the economy, due to the access of group 
members to the cash flow and assets of other firms in the group. A few studies have been 
developed on the basis of this assumption.
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) follow this strategy in an application to 
business groups in Japan. They define a business group as the set of firms that have close 
financial ties to banks, who are presumably better informed about these firms. They 
argue that in the absence of information problems, liquidity should not matter for 
corporate investment decisions. Their main finding is that investment of independent 
firms has a high and significant sensitivity to liquidity and production, whereas for group 
affiliated firms this coefficient is small and insignificant. They are able to control for 
Tobin’s average q, as a proxy for investment opportunities, in the specified equation and 
find a small but significant effect on investment. This evidence provides support for the 
view that capital market imperfections affect real variables: for financially constrained 
15
firms, an increase in current profits and liquidity has a positive impact on investment and 
output.
Shin and Park (2003) replicate this study for Korean chaebols and find evidence 
consistent with the internal capital markets hypothesis. They also find that investment 
for chaebol firms is related to growth opportunities, while this does not hold for non-
chaebol firms. They conclude that the internal capital markets in chaebols reduce the 
existing financing constraints of these group firms. However, the assessment of 
efficiency is not positive; that is, internal capital markets do not necessarily improve 
allocation efficiency. 
A theoretical model that explains the emergence of pyramids and supports to 
some extent the internal capital markets hypothesis is developed in Almeida and 
Wolfenzon (2006). Their research contributes to the business groups literature in which 
most of the work has been empirical, providing a framework for a more formal analysis. 
At odds with the traditional argument that pyramids are a device to separate ownership 
and control, these authors argue that pyramids are used to allow the family to maximize 
its internal sources of financing and to share the security benefits of new firms. The 
model analyzes the joint decision to set up a new firm and whether to place it in a 
pyramid or to keep it as a direct holding. They claim that low performance in group 
firms is not driven by pyramidal ownership, but is due instead to a selection effect. That 
is, families choose to place firms that have lower expected returns and higher capital 
requirements in pyramids. They present several arguments on the role of business groups 
and pyramids and review the existing literature that supports them. 
16
An empirical application of this model is Almeida et al. (2008). They analyze the 
evolution and determinants of Korean group ownership, instead of taking group 
ownership as exogenously given. They also propose new metrics of ownership structure, 
especially for the treatment of complex arrangements such as cross-holdings and central 
firms in a group. They conclude that ownership structure can not be considered 
exogenous as it is strategically chosen by the controlling family to match its objectives. 
Moreover, pyramids are formed when families set up firms that have low profitability 
and high capital requirements. In contrast, families decide to directly own firms 
(horizontal structure) when they are expected to be more profitable and have lower 
capital requirements. They also find that the selection of less profitable firms into 
pyramids causes the group’s central firms to trade at a discount relative to other public 
group firms.
As just presented, the literature on pyramidal ownership has been mostly 
concentrated in the empirical study of Asian and European countries, while scarce 
evidence is available for the case of Latin American economies. This research 
contributes to the literature on business groups and their motivation to form corporate 
pyramids. I attempt to disentangle the relevance of two competing hypothesis with a new 
and more comprehensive dataset. The application to the case of a developing economy 
that recently faced a profound crisis and a significant switch in monetary regime sheds 
light on the role of capital market imperfections and their link to business groups in this 
context.
17
CHAPTER III
DATA AND BACKGROUND
Ecuadorian business groups
Several stylized facts of business groups around the world apply to the case of 
Ecuadorian groups. One of the most remarkable is the predominance of family firms, 
which have high concentration in ownership10 and extensive control and management of 
firms.11 They usually form complex ownership structures such as crossholdings and 
pyramids in their groups. Some statistics that show these features are presented in the 
following section.
In addition, especially in the case of small countries, groups usually hold a major 
share of the economy and have significant connections to the government and policy 
makers. This is the most frequent issue that motivates the discussion of Ecuadorian 
groups, for which mostly anecdotal evidence has been presented. A common explanation 
that fits the phenomenon of business groups in Ecuador is described by Morck (2005). 
Different institutions in different countries are the product of customs, cultures and 
traditions. The absence of sound institutions that protect property rights, enforce 
                                                          
10 According to Haber (2002) concentrated ownership is very common in Latin American economies as a 
byproduct of French law. 
11 Family in the management is an issue that has been widely analyzed in the literature. See for instance 
Claessens et al. (2000) for the case of 9 East Asian economies; Faccio and Lang (2002) for the case of 13 
Western European economies. Also, there is a potential impact on the firm value due to the allocation of 
family members in the management as analyzed in Villalonga and Amit (2006).
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agreements, and encourage the payment of taxes leads to the proliferation of oligarchic 
institutions.12 This situation applies to the typical Latin American country.
For the case of Ecuador, Arosemena (2001) argues that economic uncertainty and 
instability dampen the ability of individuals and firms to trust institutions, resulting in 
the use of alternative means to protect their investments. Such alternative means include 
the formation of business groups and the use of complicated ownership schemes in 
search of legal protection. 
A few years ago, the Ecuadorian Internal Revenue Service started a program to 
identify business groups and their affiliates, separating them from other corporate 
taxpayers. The purpose of this project is to optimize tax collection by fighting tax 
avoidance in business groups. They define 17 major business groups in 2003 and added 
25 additional groups to the list in 2006. The research unit in charge of the identification 
made use of financial statements, as well as trade records for each of the firms (imports 
and exports) to establish the links among them. They apply the following definition of 
business groups: “a set of natural or legal persons such that, through any kind of 
connection direct or indirect, are able to exert control over the economic activity of 
related companies.”13
The process of identifying the groups followed several stages. First, a root family 
name and the most representative firm(s) in the hands of that family were selected. In the
first level, individuals and companies with ownership in this root company were 
                                                          
12 Additionally Morck (2005) argues that “the governance of most economic activity is entrusted to 
wealthy oligarchs who use the state to protect their interests, and most of the population lives without 
meaningful property rights or extensive public goods”.
13 This definition fits the standard use of the tem in the literature. Source: IRS “Grupos Economicos” 
(2008).
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identified, as well as other companies with the same family members as shareholders. In 
the second level, several individuals or companies with direct or indirect ownership 
greater than 50% in these and related companies were identified. Finally, other related 
parties such as individuals with strong family ties or companies with important 
economic interdependence (clients, suppliers, exports, imports) were identified. The 
final list of business group firms includes 1,163 companies. 
The dataset I use for the analysis consists of financial and ownership information 
on Ecuadorian companies from 2000 to 2005. It is provided by Superintendencia de 
Compañías, which is a government supervision agency for private companies in 
Ecuador. The relevant sample includes 37,899 firm-year observations for 6,559 stand-
alone and 621 group firms. Some details on data management are discussed in Appendix
A.
Most of the analysis in the area of business groups and pyramids relies on the 
assumption that all firms in business groups are organized as pyramids. The evidence 
presented here shows that this is not necessarily the case for the Ecuadorian economy. 
I first make the empirical distinction between a business group and a pyramid. In 
this paper I follow the definition made by the IRS and previous literature; a business 
group is a set of firms that are related by common ownership (and control). The family, 
which is considered the controlling shareholder, can own firms directly or indirectly, 
through other firms that belong to them. These ownership “connections” among group 
firms allow the formation of pyramids. That is, a pyramid is formed when two (or more) 
related firms have holdings on another. A horizontal structure is the case in which a 
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family member or several family members directly hold shares of the firm. A cross-
holding is a situation in which two different firms own shares of each other at the same 
time. 
Different ownership structures appear as a result; groups will have pyramidal 
ownership structures, others will use more horizontal structures, or a mix. A pair of 
simple examples of group structures is presented in Appendix B, along with an example 
of an actual pyramid in a certain Ecuadorian business group.
Because of the richness in ownership data I am able to distinguish pyramidal and 
non-pyramidal group firms.14 That is, I constructed the actual pyramids and classified 
according to their observed position or ranking.15 There is a wide range of ownership 
structures available in this case. Specifically, about 50% of the companies are pyramidal 
while the remainder is strictly horizontally owned by the family, as is discussed in the 
next section. The average number of firms per group is 15, while the average number of 
firms per pyramid is 6. In conclusion, a substantial amount of variation within each 
group in terms of ownership arrangements is observed.
Data and statistics
To better understand the differences that arise from the ownership structure I first 
compare group versus stand-alone companies. They are characterized in terms of key 
features that are relevant for the analysis. Later on, a similar comparison for group firms, 
                                                          
14 Unfortunately the ownership information is only available at the moment for the last year of my panel 
observations. That is, no variation in ownership is observed. I could argue that no significant changes 
occurred in the relevant period.
15 The classification of firms as pyramidal was made on the basis of the ownership information. The 
position or rank assigned to each firm is the directly observed to simplify the analysis. 
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pyramid and non-pyramid, is presented. This description allows me to identify key 
differences among each set of firms and gain better knowledge of their standing in the 
economy. 
Table 1 presents the statistics for the relevant sample of group and non-group 
firms separately. There are important size differences between group and stand-alone 
firms. The average value of assets for group firms is about seven times the assets of an 
stand-alone firm. A similar relation is found in terms of firm sales. This is a common 
feature of business groups.
There is also a remarkable difference in capital expenditures. An average group 
firm seems to invest about six times more than a comparable non-group firm. On the 
other side, rates of return on assets reveal small but significant differences in 
profitability. The average rate of return for a group firm seems to be lower than the 
comparable stand-alone firm. This feature provides evidence for the existence of flows 
among group firms16. Additionally, group firms are on average 5 years older than stand-
alone firms. Mean comparison tests between these two groups confirm significant 
differences for all of the variables, except for the average sales growth.
                                                          
16 This fact is more consistent with the tunneling hypothesis, since firms lose value when expropriation of 
minority shareholders takes place. On the other hand, internal capital markets should allocate resources to 
the most profitable projects. The related co-insurance hypothesis argues that poor performing group firms 
may also be subsidized by the group’s “cash cows”. Hence, on average returns on assets may be lower for 
the group affiliated. 
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Table 1
Statistics for the relevant sample
All Stand-alone Group
Assets* 1,339
(6,642)
890
(4,249)
5,847
(16,800)
EBIDTA* 99
(1,022)
66
(735)
426
(2,444)
Sales* 1,757
(9,624)
1,223
5,795)
7,575
(26,400)
Investment* 352
(2,687)
237
(1,674)
1,394
(6,803)
Cash Flow* 93
(1,192)
63
(796)
370
(2,927)
ROA* 0.062
(0.162)
0.063
(0.164)
0.051
(0.142)
Sales Growth 0.190
(0.982)
0.194
(0.994)
0.152
(0.859)
Age* 16.240
(11.243)
15.740
(10.858)
21.254
(13.578)
Capital intensity* 10.990
(15.076)
10.770
(14.897)
13.731
(16.920)
Ownership Concentration* 6,502    6,487 6,660
(HHI) (2,995) (2,985) (3,086)
Off-shore Dummy* 0.118    0.086 0.456
(0.323)          (0.281)          (0.498)
Off-shore Shareholding* 0.079   0.054    0.342    
(0.246)          (0.205)          (0.426)
Observations 37,899 34,464 3,435
Firms 7,180 6,559 621
a. Data Source: Superintendencia de Compañías, Ecuador for the years 2000-2005. All monetary 
variables are expressed in thousands of dollars. 
b. Standard Deviations are in parentheses
c. * indicates Mean comparison test:  Significant at 1% 
I also include a measure of capital intensity that accounts for potential 
differences in industry operation and use of capital inputs for group and stand-alone 
firms. The ratio reveals a larger relative use of capital for business groups. One 
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interpretation for this difference could be the selection of groups firms into certain 
industries. Although this is not the focus of this research, there is one stream of literature 
that deals with diversification of business groups (Khanna and Ghemawat (1998), 
Khanna and Palepu(2000)). A related issue is an implication of the internal capital 
markets hypothesis. In the presence of imperfect capital markets, due to presumably 
higher cash flow availability and lower costs of capital, group firms may tend to 
overinvest. In any case, the capital intensity measure might play a bigger role in pyramid 
formation than in group formation. 
To gain a rough idea of ownership concentration in Ecuadorian firms I compute 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index that confirms a high level of ownership concentration in 
this economy with an average value of 6,500. It is worth noticing the small but 
significant difference in this measure for group and stand-alone firms.
Finally, I identify the presence of shareholders that are established in off-shore 
jurisdictions. This feature is summarized by two variables. The first is an indicator 
variable for the presence of off-shore shareholders in the firm and the second is the total 
share held by this type of holders in the firm. The observed presence of many off-shore 
locations among the firms’ shareholders’ declared nationality allows me to construct the 
variables17. About 46% of the group firms have at least one shareholder in an off-shore 
jurisdiction contrasting with the 9% that represents non-group firms. Their presence is 
also associated with search for legal protection and tax avoidance, but somehow groups 
firms are more involved in this type of ownership practice.
                                                          
17 The list of fiscal paradises was obtained from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) cooperative and uncooperative tax havens. 
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In summary, there are significant differences between group-affiliated and stand-
alone firms in this economy. As well financial performance and ownership patterns 
differ for these two groups of firms. However, the ownership structure may play a bigger 
role among group firms.
The next question to explore regards the determinants for pyramidal ownership 
within a group. Are the firms chosen by the family to be placed in a pyramid different 
than non-pyramidal group firms? Table 2 presents the statistics on horizontally owned 
and pyramidal firms. As mentioned earlier, the proportion of group firms in pyramids is 
similar to the proportion that is horizontally owned. 
According to these figures, pyramidal firms are bigger on average; their assets 
more than double those of non-pyramidal firms. The rate of return on assets is not 
significantly different from that of non-pyramid firms, contrasting with the prediction of 
Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) model in which families choose to place firms with 
lower expected returns in pyramids. Another prediction in Almeida and Wolfenzon’s 
model is that pyramids develop over time; hence, younger firms are found in pyramids. 
However, in my dataset pyramidal firms are on average three years older than non-
pyramidal firms.
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Table 2
Pyramidal firm’s characterization
Non-pyramidal Pyramid
Assets* 3,537
(13,600)
8,108
(19,200)
EBIDTA* 195
(1,751)
651
(2,953)
Sales* 4,171
(15,600)
10,800
(33,200)
Investment* 648
(6,438)
2,033
(7,053)
Cash Flow* 199
(2,069)
606
(3,056)
ROA 0.047
(0.144)
0.056
(0.139)
Investment Rate 0.961
(1.251)
1.075
(1.370)
Sales Growth 0.135
(0.873)
0.152
(0.809)
Age* 19.666
(11.751)
22.809
(14.997)
Capital Intensity* 10.850
(14.999)
14.469
(16.524)
Direct family share* 0.287
(0.396)
0.173
(0.314)
Pyramid share* 0.000
(0.000)
0.440
(0.436)
Total family share* 0.287
(0.396)
0.613
(0.400)
Observations 1,699 1,736
Firms 311 310
a. Data Source: Superintendencia de Compañías, Ecuador for the years 2000-2005. All monetary 
variables are expressed in thousands of dollars. 
b. Standard Deviations are in parentheses
c. * indicates Mean comparison test:  Significant at 1% 
This model also predicts that firms with higher capital requirements are placed in 
pyramids, a fact supported in this case because pyramidal firms appear to be more 
capital intensive than horizontally owned firms and to invest significantly more. It seems 
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like the lower cost of investment, since it is shared with other external shareholders, 
generates an incentive to overinvest in pyramidal firms. This issue illustrates some 
negative efficiency implications of pyramids.
An additional feature that is worth noting is the difference in average family 
ownership18 for the two categories. The direct family ownership for group firms is 23%, 
consistent with similar evidence for developed and developing economies. As expected 
the family share is larger for non-pyramidal firms. However, for the total family share, 
pyramidal group firms’ holdings double the value of non-pyramidal firms’ holdings.  
There is a significant difference between family shareholdings for pyramidal and non-
pyramidal firms of about 32 percentage points.
This feature is not pertinent to Ecuadorian groups only. Morck (2004) recognizes 
different ownership patterns around the world. For instance, in a Japanese keiretsu, each 
member firm owns a small share of the others. Although each individual inter-corporate 
equity stake is small, a majority of the stock in each firm is held collectively by all other 
firms in that group. This is different from other countries in which groups have one 
major controlling shareholder, instead of having many dissipated members. In this case, 
the evidence shows a lot of variation in the ownership structure.
Another question that is worth exploring concerns the position in which a firm is 
placed inside a pyramid. As mentioned before, I organized the ownership data and put 
together the pyramids in each group. Firms at the top of the pyramids and directly owned 
                                                          
18 Each business group in the sample is identified with a family name. Direct family shareholding is the 
total share of the company in the hands of individuals with the family name. Pyramid shareholding is the 
total share of the company owned by related companies, or indirectly by the family. 
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by family members were assigned a level of 1 in the pyramid. In the same fashion, firms 
owned by firms at level 1 were assigned level 2, and consequently with all other 
pyramidal firms. The last level was level 4 for firms at the bottom. Statistics for these 
groups are presented in Table 3.
Table 3
Firm’s characteristics by pyramid level
Pyramid Level 1 2 3 4
Assets** 13,100
(28,200)
6,069
(12,600)
4,963
(10,200)
2,608
(2,739)
EBIDTA 1,184
(4,553)
393
(1,803)
416
(1,109)
130
(211)
Sales* 15,800
(47,000)
9,296
(25,600)
4,875
(8,644)
2,678
(2,760)
Investment 3,205
(10,300)
1,499
(4,851)
1,379
(3,713)
545
(616)
Cash Flow 1,172
(4,661)
338
(1,984)
311
(898)
100
(206)
ROA 0.051
(0.139)
0.063
(0.147)
0.049
(0.126)
0.036
(0.054)
Sales Growth 0.157
(0.825)
0.173
(0.876)
0.099
(0.562)
-0.026
(0.288)
Age** 27.436
(16.460)
21.080
(14.639)
18.845
(9.519)
21.667
(17.348)
Capital intensity 15.037
(15.434)
14.302
(17.494)
13.890
(16.204)
14.054
(11.970)
Direct Family share* 0.340
(0.404)
0.121
(0.246)
0.021
(0.077)
0.000
(0.000)
Pyramid share* 0.035
(0.151)
0.573
(0.394)
0.812
(0.319)
0.594
(0.401)
Total Family Share* 0.375
(0.405)
0.694
(0.342)
0.833
(0.305)
0.594
(0.401)
Observations 571 835 291 39
Firms 100 151 51 8
a. Data Source: Superintendencia de Compañías, Ecuador for the years 2000-2005. All monetary 
variables are expressed in thousands of dollars. 
b. Standard Deviations are in parentheses
c. * indicates Mean comparison test between levels 1 and 4: * Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 
5%
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Bertrand et al. (2002) assume that firm’s level in a pyramid is correlated to cash 
flow rights of controlling shareholders. The following statistics show that this 
assumption holds for the case of Ecuadorian business groups. Direct family shares 
decrease as the level in the pyramid declines. Moreover the magnitude of total family 
holdings – over 60% for firms that are not at the top - support the idea that the family 
keeps control rights without large entitlement to the firms’ cash flow.19
The financial indicators of these firms, such as assets, profits, and sales, seem to 
decrease as the level in the pyramid declines. Although the average values for some of 
the variables vary erratically across pyramid levels, there is a consistent differential 
pattern in size and profitability between firms at the top (level 1) and firms at the bottom 
(level 4).
Group affiliation and pyramidal ownership raise an important endogeneity issue. It 
is not clear how the expected performance of a new project determines whether a family 
associated with a business group will set up the new firm. At the same time within a 
group, firms can be placed into a pyramid and given a certain position within the 
pyramid because they are expected to be bigger or more profitable, but the ownership 
structure and the position can determine its performance as well. To support the 
comparison between group and stand-alone firms, I need to make the assumption that
group affiliation is exogenously determined. A detailed discussion on this issue is 
presented in the following section.
                                                          
19 A standard benchmark for the control of the firm is 50% of the ownership.
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CHAPTER IV
THE TUNNELING HYPOTHESIS
Methodology
Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) provide a framework to measure the 
existence and the extent of tunneling in pyramidal business groups. The flow of cash 
through a pyramid is tracked by analyzing the propagation of exogenous industry shocks 
to profits according to the firm’s rank in the pyramid. These shocks allow the 
construction of a predicted performance measure that is compared to the observed 
performance of the firm.
Since only group firms are able to transfer profits among affiliates, in the presence 
of  tunneling, a difference between actual performance and predicted performance arises. 
That is, following a shock to profits, group firms respond less than one-for-one to a 
shock in contrast to non-group firms. The proposed specification is
(1)
where 
perfjtI is profits for firm j at time t in industry I,
predjtI is the shock, 
groupj is the dummy variable with value equal to one for group affiliated firms, and
ujtI is the error term.
jtIjtIjjtIjtI controlsdpredgroupcpredbaperf  jtItj uTimeFirm 
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The shock represents the predicted profits for the firm in the absence of 
tunneling,20 and its coefficient is expected to have a value close to one. The interaction 
term captures the differential sensitivity of group firms to the shock; a negative sign on 
the coefficient provides evidence that supports the diversion of profits. Some controls for 
age and size are included, based on the differences in these characteristics of group and 
stand-alone firms as presented in the sample statistics.
Additional predictions are tested by modifying the preceding basic specification. 
To test the view that within a group the aggregate shock of other firms affects the profits 
of the firm, the following specification is used:
(2)
where 
opredjtI is the summation of the shocks of all other firms in the group, except for firm j.
The key to separating the tunneling hypothesis from other motivations to form 
pyramids is the direction that resources follow in such a structure. To preliminarily 
assess this idea, I separate the aggregate shock of other group members according to 
their position in the pyramid. According to the tunneling hypothesis, the impact of lower 
level firms’ aggregate shocks on an average firm’s profits should be greater than the 
shocks of firms at the top. Bertrand uses cash flow rights as a proxy for rank of the firm 
in the pyramid. I am able to test this hypothesis using observed position in the next 
section.  The estimated specification is:
(3)
                                                          
20 The shock is computed as the product of the firm’s total assets and an asset-weighted average of the 
return for all firms in the industry, excluding the firm itself. For details see Bertrand et al. (2002).
jtItjjtIjtIjtIjtI uTimeFirmcontrolsdopredcpredbaperf 
jtItjjtIjtIjtIjtIjtI uTimeFirmcontrolseHopreddLopredcpredbaperf 
31
where
and Pcrit is a critical position level that separates top firms from bottom firms in a 
pyramid.
The prediction that money flows from the bottom to the top of the pyramid is 
tested by separately estimating equation (3) for firms at the top and firms at the bottom, 
which is the cross effect of shocks. A bigger and significant impact of the shock of firms 
at the bottom on the profits of firms at the top supports the flow of resources in this 
direction.
Hence, for firms at the bottom,
(4)
For firms at the top:
(5)
The main predictions of tunneling in this context are summarized as 
 cH > cL, 
 cH > dH, and 
 dL is very small or insignificant.
Briefly, these are relatively simple tests to assess the existence of tunneling in 
any economy when information on assets, profits, group affiliation, and pyramidal 
ownership are available at the firm level.
jtItjjtIjtILjtILjtIjtI uTimeFirmcontrolseHopreddLopredcpredbaperf 
jtItjjtIjtIHjtIHjtIjtI uTimeFirmcontrolseHopreddLopredcpredbaperf 
jtIPposition
jtI
crit
predHopred  
jtIPposition
jtI
crit
predLopred  
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As discussed earlier, a common assumption in the literature is the exogeneity of 
group ownership. Its adequacy is discussed in detail on the next section.
Exogeneity of business group affiliation
The assumption that business group affiliation is exogenous has been widely 
used in empirical literature. Khanna and Yafeh (2007) provide a fair discussion on the 
issue and emphasize the need to include endogenous group formation in the future 
research agenda. The analysis here extends the literature by considering both exogenous 
and endogenous group formation.
Pyramidal placement (within a group) and the position of a firm in a pyramid are
a related issue that deals with endogeneity as well. Almeida et al. (2008) present a 
formal attempt to assess the exogeneity assumption using a sample of Korean chaebol
firms. They observe the addition of new firms to groups and conclude that their ex-ante 
profitability and capital requirements determine the decision of the family to place them 
in a pyramid. This is at odds with the traditional argument that pyramids are created to 
separate ownership and control and that agency problems cause low profitability of these 
firms. Their work focuses on the determination of pyramidal vs. horizontal ownership, as 
well as on the level of the pyramid where the firm is placed. That is, they analyze the 
specific ownership structure adopted by a firm, once it is owned by a family group.
In this work, I first present some anecdotal evidence to support the assumption of 
exogenous group affiliation and then proceed to carry out a more formal analysis. A 
limitation of my dataset is that I observe full ownership information at certain a period in 
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time, but no changes in the structure over the years. However, given the short period of 
analysis I will maintain the assumption of no ownership or group affiliation changes in 
time.
For the case of the Ecuadorian economy, the presence of family business group 
contributes to support the exogeneity assumption. Since family business practices are 
related to family dynamics, values and traditions are passed along with businesses. 
Issues like succession planning to guarantee the firm survival and continuation in the
family hands are the frequent concern of founders21. That is, family members usually
work to keep the group together and growing. Moreover, as Poutziouris (2006) argues
family managers tend to favor internally generated funds as a source of additional capital 
followed by external debt and finally by external equity.22 The combination of these 
factors has lead to group formation and survival.
Despite this anecdotal evidence I acknowledge the potential existence of 
endogeneity in group affiliation. That is, in the performance equation the correlation 
between the independent variable and the error term introduces a bias in the estimation 
of the coefficient of interest. Specifically in this case the problem is the presence of 
                                                          
21 As Westhead and Howorth (2006) claim: Important objectives cited by owners of family firms include: 
survival of the family business as a going concern; continued independent ownership of the firm; transfer 
of ownership to the next generation; maintaining financial independence, and employment of family 
members.
22 The reluctance to use external financing can be associated to the lack of legal guarantees and investor 
protection La Porta el al. (2002) explains how the legal system shapes ownership structures. This has also 
contributed to the lack of active stock markets. Just recently, in 1994, the stock market law established the 
“Corporacion Civil Bolsa de Valores” of Quito and Guayaquil, creating the only two existing Stock 
Exchange in the country. The great volume that is traded there corresponds mostly to government, banks, 
and other financial institutions products. There are about 100 companies (non-government and non-
financial) that are actively listed in these two main stock markets, which is a very limited share of the total 
productive firms in the economy.
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unobservable factors related to the probability of group ownership (for instance, 
managerial ability of the family).  
To account for the validity of comparison between business group and stand-
alone firms, I first intend to assess the impact of some observables on the probability of 
group ownership as described in equation (6):
(6)
The results for this estimation are presented in Table D.1 in Appendix D. They 
show that firm characteristics such as age, size, and off-shore ownership have a 
significant impact on the probability of group affiliation.
Indeed the most important explanatory variable in the model is off-shore 
ownership. In the statistics previously presented, I find significant differences in the 
mean value of this indicator for group and non-group firms. Anecdotal evidence 
attributes this pattern to the ability of controlling families to set up companies in off-
shore jurisdictions to take advantage of the legal benefits they provide. Business groups 
receive greater returns of establishing an off-shore firm and indirectly owning their 
companies through it because of the flexibility of the institutional system, the avoidance 
of constraints of bureaucracy, and the confidentiality that their shareholders benefit 
from. These motives are presumably not affecting the financial performance of the firm.
Table D.2 presents the Spearman rank correlation matrix for key variables in the
analysis. Group affiliation is highly correlated with the presence of off-shore 
shareholders in a firm, as well as with the share of equity holders established in fiscal 
paradises.
jjjjj usizeeoffshoredagebanaffiliatiogroup 
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To summarize I argue that off-shore shareholding, while significantly explaining 
group affiliation, is presumably uncorrelated with the ex-ante firm profitability. Hence I 
will use this feature as an instrument for group affiliation.
I use an instrumental variables model, estimated by limited information 
maximum likelihood for a more robust approach, using firm’s age and off-shore 
holdings as instruments. Table D.3 in appendix D presents the results for these
estimations and the corresponding endogeneity tests, which do not reject the null 
hypothesis of an exogenous regressor.
Finally, I estimate the basic model assuming endogenous determination of profits 
and group affiliation. The main equation specifies the relationship between firm’s profits 
and the firm’s shock that potentially differs among group affiliates and stand-alone
firms. Hence, it is estimated as an endogenous switching regression model, where 
equation (1)’ is separately estimated for group and non-group firms 
(1)’
and a selection equation for group affiliation as equation (6) specified as a function of 
age, size and off-shore holdings. The system of three equations is simultaneously 
estimated by the full information maximum likelihood approach23.
The results for the estimates of group and non-group equations are presented in 
Table D.4 in Appendix D. The response to the shock is close to one as expected, for both 
sets of firms. Moreover, it is significantly smaller for group firms as suggested by the 
                                                          
23 The MLE is consistent and asymptotically efficient yielding more reliable estimates.
jtIjtIjtI controlsdpredbaperf  jtItj uTimeFirm 
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tunneling story. The variables included in the selection equation have significant 
coefficients, similar to the previous probit estimation. 
The additional parameters results show rho0 and rho1, the correlation 
coefficients between the main and the selection equations for stand-alone and group 
firms, respectively. Since they are not significantly different from zero, this suggests the 
lack of unobserved factors that jointly affect the firm’s likelihood of group affiliation 
and its performance. Although the evaluation of rho=0 is not a formal test of 
endogeneity, it provides partial support for the exogeneity of group affiliation. 
Additionally, the Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis of independent equations.
In conclusion, all the previous tests results question the endogenous affiliation of 
firms to Ecuadorian business groups allowing for the comparison of group and non-
group firms in the next section. 
Results
The test for tunneling is based on Bertrand et al. (2002) methodology. I estimate 
a panel data fixed effects model for specification (1). Firm fixed effects and year 
dummies are included in every specification and standard errors are clustered to account 
for serial correlation. The panel includes 37,899 firm-year observations on Ecuadorian 
companies. 
Estimates for equation (1) are shown in Table 4. The shock coefficient illustrates 
the average response of a firm to a shock in earnings. That is, in response to a one dollar 
shock to earnings, an increase of 0.87 dollars is expected for the average firm as 
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presented in column (a). It is assumed to be close to 1 in absence of any diversion, 
tunneling, or dissipation of profits. The interaction variable between the shock and group 
dummy distinguishes the impact of group and non-group firms in response to the shock. 
The tunneling hypothesis argues that group firms should show a smaller sensitivity to 
shocks due to the diversion of profits to affiliates. Hence this coefficient is expected to
be negative. In this case, a significant and negative value of -0.698 confirms a smaller 
increase in profits in response to a shock for a group firm. These figures suggest a very 
modest response of 0.17 dollars to a one dollar shock for group affiliated firms and a 
significant amount of tunneling.
Table 4
Differential sensitivity of group shock
(1) (2)
Shock 0.87 0.456
(8.84)** (1.83)
Affiliate * Shock -0.698 -0.912
(2.45)* (3.23)**
Log(Assets) -298 5,087
(0.05) (0.65)
Age * Shock 0.018
(2.33)*
Constant 52,503 -16,991
(0.66) (0.18)
Observations 37,899 37,899
Number of firms 7,180 7,180
R-squared 0.07 0.09
a. Data Source: Superintendencia de Compañías, Ecuador for the years 2000-2005. 
b. Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
c. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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The statistics in Table 1 suggest that group firms are older and bigger than stand-
alone firms. Accordingly, some controls for size and age are included in the estimation 
to capture the impact that these differences between group and non-group companies 
could have on the effect of the shock. When these controls are introduced, the shock 
coefficient is smaller, suggesting that profits are somehow dissipated. However, the 
differential and smaller impact of the shock for group firms is very robust and supports 
the existence of tunneling.
To test the second prediction – equation (2) - that firms respond to shocks of 
other firms in their group, a similar specification is estimated with the sample of group 
firms only. In this case the variable ‘shock of other firms in the group’ is included. In 
the presence of tunneling, a positive effect of others’ shocks in the firm’s earnings is 
expected. 
The results in Table 5 show an important effect of the aggregate shock of related 
firms that adds to the firm’s own shock to support the tunneling of resources. Basically, 
a one dollar shock to related firms’ earnings increases the firm’s profits by 2.3 cents. 
With an average of 15 firms in a group and the typical firm tunneling away 70 cents, the 
estimate of diverted money that is showing up somewhere else is about 50%. The major 
economic implication of this measure lies in the potential inefficiencies that arise with 
tunneling24.
                                                          
24 Again, there is evidence that profits are somehow dissipated. Roughly speaking, this could be 
interpreted as an additional cost of tunneling in terms of firm value.
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Table 5
Sensitivity to shock of others in the group
(1) (2)
Shock 0.871 0.457
(8.87)** (1.84)
Affiliate * Shock -0.704 -0.919
(2.48)* (3.27)**
Others’ Shock 0.023 0.023
(2.23)* (2.32)*
Log(Assets) -780 4,605
(0.12) (0.60)
Age * Shock 0.018
(2.34)*
Constant 41,824 -27,642
(0.53) (0.30)
Observations 37,899 37,899
Number of firms 7,180 7,180
R-squared 0.07 0.1
a. Data Source: Superintendencia de Compañías, Ecuador for the years 2000-2005.
b. Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
c. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The positive impact of group affiliates’ shocks to earnings of the average firm is 
not only consistent with the tunneling hypothesis. Since it only provides evidence that 
resources are flowing within the group but not indicating the direction, it could also 
support the existence of internal capital markets to some extent. Additional analyses are 
performed later on the effect of a group’s liquidity on the firm’s investment decision to
further explore this issue.
The next step is the assessment of the direction that money follows in a pyramid. 
The effects of the shocks of bottom and top firms in a pyramid are separately computed 
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for this purpose. The criterion to classify firms at the top is ranking in the pyramid equal 
to 1. Firms at a position 2, 3 or 4 are bottom firms. 
Table 6
Are firms sensitive to shocks of others at the bottom?
(1) (2)
Shock 0.87 0.456
(8.85)** (1.84)
Affiliate * Shock -0.704 -0.919
(2.47)* (3.27)**
Shock of Firms at Bottom 0.028 0.028
(1.94) (2.11)*
Shock of Firms at Top 0.013 0.014
(0.61) (0.65)
Log(Assets) -562 4,821
(0.09) (0.62)
Age * Shock 0.018
(2.34)*
Constant 45,882 -23,941
(0.58) (0.26)
Observations 37,899 37,899
Number of firms 7,180 7,180
R-squared 0.07 0.1
a. Data Source: Superintendencia de Compañías, Ecuador for the years 2000-2005. 
b. Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
c. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The results presented in Table 6 show that the aggregate shock of firms at the 
bottom has a bigger (and significant) impact on the profits of the average firm than the 
shock of firms at the top. Moreover, for the latter group the coefficient is not significant. 
That is, firms respond on average to shocks of firms further down in the pyramid and 
show no response to those of higher level firms. In conclusion, these outcomes suggest 
that money flows from the bottom of pyramids as the tunneling hypothesis argues. 
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Finally, I analyze the cross effect of shocks, using separate samples for firms at 
the top and firms at the bottom of the pyramid. These models correspond to 
specifications (4) and (5). This is basically the same model as in the previous estimation, 
but I split the sample according to the pyramidal position of firms. 
The estimation is based on the sample of pyramidal firms only. Table 7 shows a
bigger impact of the shock of firms at the bottom on the profits of firms at the top and
supports the flow of resources in this direction. Although barely significant, the 
coefficient that measures this impact is much larger than the case where the full sample 
is used, suggesting that money flows to firms at the top of the pyramid.
Table 7
Are higher up firms more sensitive to shocks of lower down?
Bottom Top
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shock 0.316 0.207 0.322 0.521
(1.34) (0.88) (1.13) (0.59)
Shock of Firms 0.011 0.011 0.045 0.046
at Bottom (0.69) (0.71) (1.34) (1.44)
Shock of Firms -0.02 -0.021 0.034 0.034
at Top (0.83) (0.83) (0.65) (0.65)
Log(Assets) -79,454 -73,015 498,915 488,116
(0.91) (0.85) (1.63) (1.60)
Age * Shock 0.003 -0.005
(0.30) (0.31)
Constant 1,231,761 1,145,040 -6,788,023 -6,640,034
(0.99) (0.92) (1.50) (1.47)
Observations 1,165 1,165 571 571
Number of firms 210 210 100 100
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.06
a. Data Source: Superintendencia de Compañías, Ecuador for the years 2000-2005. 
b. Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
c. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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In the case of other coefficients (separate impact of shocks to bottom firms) the 
reduced significance of coefficients is still consistent with the presence of tunneling. 
That is, money does not flow from the top to the bottom.
In conclusion, there is significant support for the tunneling hypothesis. The 
patterns for the flow of resources are consistent with the reallocation of profits. 
However, the incentives that controlling shareholders have when deciding the ownership 
structure cannot be anticipated only on the grounds of these results. 
There are several issues that could limit the reliability of these results. First, the 
possibility of a mismeasurement of firm industry would bias the results. In my data, only 
one SIC code is self-reported by the firm. This is presumably the one that best describes 
the company’s activities. However, in the ideal setup a more detailed list of products and 
activities would be convenient, since industry classification is the key for the 
construction of the shocks. Second, the lack of market valuation information makes the 
study totally dependent on accounting information, which is potentially less reliable. On
the other hand, the lack of market information is compensated with the availability of 
information for all the firms in the economy and not only those non-listed, which is the 
standard in this type of studies. 
The next chapter presents some results on alternative tests for the motivation of 
pyramids. 
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CHAPTER V
THE INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS HYPOTHESIS
Methodology
The evidence presented in the previous chapter vastly supported the tunneling 
hypothesis. This chapter provides some elements to assess an alternative view on the 
existence of pyramids: the use of internal capital markets. The economic justification for 
this hypothesis relies on classic theoretical work on financial economics by Modigliani 
and Miller (1958). Under the assumption of perfect capital markets, the financial policy 
of the firm should not affect the firm value. But when certain market failures appear25, 
firms may decide to use their own funds to finance investment.
In a seminal paper, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1987) argue that the 
investment to cash flow sensitivity provides a good test for the existence of financial 
constraints. They claim that a firm’s investment will be more sensitive to its liquidity
when the firm faces severe financing constraints. Hence, a common econometric 
exercise in the corporate finance literature is to estimate the investment equation for two 
or more groups that differ in the degree of financial constraints. 
I will assume that group-affiliated firms are less financially constrained
following Hoshi, et al. (1991) who apply a similar methodology in the study of Japanese 
keiretsu. This assumption is particularly valid in the case of a developing economy, 
where capital market imperfections abound. When certain institutions such as business 
                                                          
25 The capital market is plagued by severe information asymmetries, especially in developing economies.
Also, taxes and transaction costs, including bankruptcy costs challenge this assumption in practice.
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groups arise, they bring about some financial advantages to the affiliates that stand-alone 
firms cannot obtain. 
There are different mechanisms through which the reallocation of resources 
inside a group takes place. First, the potential existence of highly liquid firms allows 
controlling shareholders to reassign profits among group firms with better investment 
opportunities.26 Second, several groups participate not only in productive sectors of the 
economy, but also in the financial sector. That is, they are able to act as financial 
intermediaries and presumably offer better credit arrangements to their affiliates.  Third, 
the reputation of the business group may be beneficial to its members in terms of access 
and costs of credit in the external capital market. This chapter focuses on the use of 
pyramids to facilitate the functioning of the first above mentioned mechanism. That is, 
while every firm has access its own resources, a business group member is also able to 
use other members’ resources to finance investment.
The baseline investment to cash flow equation is modified to include an 
interaction dummy of business group affiliation and cash flow to test for the differential 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow between the two sets of firms. The expected results 
imply a lower (or insignificant) coefficient on the cash flow for group members than for 
stand-alone firms, since they do not have to rely solely on their own liquidity to fund 
investment. The following specification is then estimated as
                                                          
26 These resources are not limited to cash, but can also extend to labor, management, and equipment, 
among others.
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      (7)
where Ijt is investment for firm j at time t, Kjt is total assets, CFjt is cash flow, and 
controls usually include average Tobin’s q for the firm. To avoid the effects of scale, the 
key variables are normalized dividing by firms’ assets in the previous period.
Additionally, given the arrangement of firms into business groups I am able to 
construct an aggregate measure of liquidity for group affiliates and determine how the 
joint availability of resources matters for the investment decision of the average group 
firm. Hence the alternative specification to be estimated using only the sample of group 
firms is
(8)
where not only the firm’s own cash flow but group cash flow is included as an 
explanatory variable. If business groups make use of internal capital markets, affiliated 
firms will presumably be sensitive to the cash flow of other group firms as well as to its 
own.
In the study of the investment to cash flow relationship, it is often argued that the 
endogeneity of the cash flow variable introduces a significant difficulty, because the 
estimated coefficient will overstate the impact of cash flow on investment.27 The quality 
of investment opportunities is an omitted variable that affects both liquidity and 
                                                          
27 However, when looking at different equations for two different groups of firms, if the bias is similar for 
the two groups’ coefficients, analyzing the difference between them may alleviate this problem. See Hoshi 
et al. (1991).
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investment. That is, successful projects usually generate large amounts of cash, and their 
investment opportunities are better, requiring higher investment levels. 
The most common approaches followed to address this problem are the use of 
exogenous shocks to cash flow, the inclusion of proxies to control for investment 
opportunities and the use of instrumental variables for cash flow. In the first case, for 
instance Lamont (1997) uses a negative shock to oil prices to assess the impact of oil 
companies in non-oil divisions’ investment decisions. He finds a significant decrease in 
investment of non-oil segments due to the decrease in profits of related oil segments and 
argues the existence of internal capital markets. Also, he presents evidence of cross-
subsidies among these divisions in the years previous to the shock.
As a proxy for investment opportunities Tobin’s q is generally the choice when 
stock market data is available. This is defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm 
to the replacement cost value of its assets. Although the use of these estimates for the 
market value of the firm is controversial, due to the potential existence of measurement 
and specification error in this variable. Also different effects of q in firms with different 
costs of external finance have been documented. Hayashi (1982) demonstrates that under 
certain conditions28 average Tobin’s q is sufficient to measure investment opportunities. 
However, in the vast related financial literature, the performance of Tobin’s q is very 
                                                          
28 Firms must operate in perfect capital markets and should have constant returns to scale technology and
no market power.
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modest overall. Finally, this information is often not available at the firm level, due to 
missing data or different methodological requirements.29
In this case, stock market information is not available because of the reduced 
fraction of public firms in the economy. The advantage of having a sample with the 
majority of non-listed firms is to focus on the relevance of the internal vis-à-vis bank 
lending and the isolation of the impact of the stock market30. 
In the absence of Tobin’s q as a control for investment opportunities, I use the 
firm’s lagged sales growth and lagged industry ROA to capture expected profitability. 
Since accounting information is usually available, other studies have used these 
variables to substitute for stock market data, with a relatively reasonable performance.
Results
As mentioned in the preceding section, the study of the investment to cash flow 
sensitivity yields a better understanding of the relevance of financial constraints for 
firms’ capital expenditure decisions. Given the differences in ownership structure 
between business group and stand-alone firms, a differential response of these two 
groups is expected. The following results correspond to the test for internal capital 
markets in Ecuadorian business groups.
                                                          
29 This might include the case in which the observation unit in the research design is the firm segment but 
the market value required to compute Tobin’s q is only available at the firm level. This is very common in 
the study of American conglomerates.
30 Additionally, I am avoiding the selection issue that other studies face when using only listed companies 
and stock market data, because families or large shareholders may decide intentionally not to list key 
group companies.
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One of the major difficulties when implementing this test is identifying criteria to 
classify a firm as financially constrained. The most common criterion used in the 
literature is dividend payout ratio, although endogeneity of this variable has been widely 
argued. In this case, I will make use of business group affiliation as an indicator of better
access to internal capital markets to proxy for fewer financial constraints. 
A variation of Equation (7) is estimated as a panel data model with firm and year 
fixed effects in the same way as the previous tunneling tests. Better estimates are 
obtained in a dynamic panel model setup to account for assets persistence across time. 
To control for investment opportunities, several proxies are included. As 
mentioned before, these proxies are constructed based on an accounting measure due to 
the lack of stock market information. In related studies comparisons of the relative 
performance of accounting measures versus market measures (usually the market to 
book ratio), show consistent results for both types of measures. I will use the firm’s 
lagged sales growth and the lagged industry ROA separately to control for investment 
opportunities. The results follow in Table 8.
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Table 8
Investment to Cash Flow sensitivity differential group vs. non-group
OLS Dynamic Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash Flow 0.138 0.144 0.15 0.14 
(15.68)** (11.26)** (10.92)** (10.96)**
Group* Cash Flow -0.041 -0.076 -0.066 -0.071
(1.65) (2.47)* (1.97)* (2.27)*
Age 0.014 0.023 0.03 0.03 
(2.79)** (19.14)** (2.95)** (3.28)**
Lag(Sales Growth) -0.011
(0.77)
Lag(ROA) 0.975 1.39 
(3.06)** (2.47)*
Lag (I/K) 0.014 0.01 0.01 
(1.44) (0.92) (1.36)
Observations 23,394 12,323 10,605 12,107
Number of firms 5,432 5,172 4,541 5,087
R-squared 0.04
a. Data Source: Superintendencia de Compañías, Ecuador for the years 2000-2005. 
b. (1) Robust t statistics in parentheses; (2), (3), (4) Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant
at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
c. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
According to the results, liquidity is a significant determinant of investment. As 
indicated in column (4), the average investment sensitivity is about 0.14, indicating that 
for each dollar of cash available to the firm, 14 cents are likely to become investment for 
any stand-alone firm.  There is a significant difference between group and stand-alone 
firms in this measure. The estimate for the sensitivity is about 0.07 for group affiliated 
members. 
These results support the hypothesis of less financially constrained group firms 
and the potential existence of internal capital markets in Ecuadorian business groups. As 
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for the controls, lagged industry ROA seems to have a positive impact on investment
although its inclusion has a very small effect on the key coefficients. In addition, the 
performance of lagged sales growth as a control for investment opportunities is fair31. I 
need to acknowledge that if these variables are poor controls for investment 
opportunities, I might be overstating the impact of a firm’s cash flows on investment if 
cash flow proxies for investment opportunities. 
In conclusion, these results provide evidence on differential responses to liquidity 
between group and non-group firms. Next, the inclusion of the aggregate cash flow of 
the group, following equation (8), is used to test the existence of internal capital markets.
The purpose of this addition is to separately identify the effect of liquidity of a firm’s 
own cash flow and its affiliated members’ cash flows on investment.
As shown in Table 9, for the sample of group firms, the reduction in the 
magnitude and significance of the own cash flow coefficient from 0.07 to 0.05 when
group cash flow is included is worth noting. The aggregate liquidity of the business 
group is relatively small but a significant determinant of the average firm investment. 
Table E.2 in the appendix allows the comparison with the estimates before this variable 
is added. 
                                                          
31 Table E.1 in the appendix presents these additional results.
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Table 9
Investment to cash flow sensitivity including the cash flow of others in the group
Group Pyramid Horizontal
Cash Flow 0.052 0.091 0.026
(1.66) (2.45)* (0.68)
Others Cash Flow 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001
(1.91)*** (4.48)** (0.88)
Lag(ROA) 2.99 -1.391 6.996
(2.08)* (1.02) (2.83)**
Age 0.042 0.08 0.043
(2.58)* (1.99)* (2.11)*
Lag(I/K) -0.027 -0.015 -0.107
(0.78) (0.34) (3.63)**
Observations 1,168 639 529
Number of firms 467 254 213
a. Data Source: Superintendencia de Compañías, Ecuador for the years 2000-2005. 
b. Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; ***significant at 
10%.
c. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Next the relevant sample, the set of group-affiliated firms, is split into pyramidal 
and horizontally owned firms to investigate differences in the ownership structure and 
investment sources. In the case of pyramidal firms, a very significant effect of the cash 
flow of other group members shows consistency with the internal capital markets 
hypothesis. This result provides support for the idea that groups’ liquidity matters to the 
determination of the firm’s investment and that the transfer of resources takes place 
mostly through pyramids.
Also, the own cash flow coefficient is affected by the introduction of group 
liquidity even more in the case of pyramidal firms. The investment to cash flow 
sensitivity is about twice as large as the value for the average group firm. It appears that 
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pyramidal firms rely more on their own liquidity and the liquidity of affiliates than 
directly owned group firms which probably have to search for external sources of 
financing for their projects. This result is consistent with ownership patterns of 
horizontally owned group firms, whose family share is significantly lower than for 
comparable pyramidal firms.
The reliability of these results is challenged by the selection of firms into 
pyramidal and horizontal ownership. For instance, if investment requirements are 
different between these two groups, the controlling family may be intentionally placing 
firms in pyramidal structure. A more adequate approach would be to account for this 
selection effect. Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) argue that capital intensive firms, larger 
and younger firms and firms with lower expected return are more likely to be placed in a 
pyramid. Hence, these variables could be used to model the choice of ownership.
Briefly, the existence of internal capital markets is supported by the evidence 
provided here, especially in the case of business group pyramidal firms. 
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The practice of tunneling and the use of internal capital markets argue the 
existence of resources transfers among group affiliated firms. However, they differ in 
terms of the shareholders’ incentives and the patterns they show in the flow of money. I 
rely on this difference to construct the tests of the motivation to form a pyramid.
I have contrasted two different hypotheses on the existence of pyramidal 
ownership structures within a business group. The results provide evidence that support 
both of them to some extent. For the tunneling story, there is evidence that a significant 
transfer of resources takes place among affiliates of Ecuadorian business groups. For the 
alternative hypothesis, the impact of aggregate group cash flow on a pyramidal firm’s 
investment suggests the existence of internal capital markets within these organizations.
As a byproduct of the tunneling estimations, some evidence of dissipation of profits may 
imply that certain inefficiencies occur during the reallocation process.
Most of the studies of business groups have focused in the analysis of these 
institutions role in countries as India, Korea, and Japan, as well as certain European 
economies. The application of this methodology to Latin American economies increases 
the knowledge of business groups and their implications in this specific region. 
This research points out additional room for research in several related areas. The 
most straightforward is probably the analysis of internal capital markets that can be 
extended to account for the choice that controlling families make on direct (horizontal) 
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versus indirect (pyramidal) ownership and its implication on the optimal resource 
allocation. 
Another extension of the current research should explore the role of links 
between productive firms and financial institutions inside the group for the development 
of internal capital markets. The formation of groups and pyramids with tax evasion 
incentives can also be explored in the case of this economy. Finally, the impact of the 
dollarization of the economy as an exogenous shock to the firms could be used to assess 
additional questions.
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APPENDIX A
DATA MANAGEMENT
My sample consists of 7,180 Ecuadorian firms between the years 2000 and 
200532. I identify group-affiliation of firms through a definition made by the Ecuadorian 
Internal Revenue Service, which links group firms to each other by family ownership 
and close ties to financial institutions. There are 621 group firms in the relevant sample.
This information is matched with the financial and ownership data obtained from 
Superintendencia de Compañías, a government supervision agency that collects the 
information on all existing companies on a yearly basis.
The key financial variables for the analysis are earnings before interest, 
depreciation, taxes and amortization (EBIDTA), cash flow (defined as operating profit 
plus depreciation), total assets, investment (defined as depreciation adjusted change in 
fixed assets), group affiliation, and industry, which is defined as firms with the same 3-
digit SIC code. 
As is standard in this literature, I drop firms that belong to the services sector and 
firms with over 50% foreign or state ownership. I use medium sized and large firms, with 
average assets over US 50,000 dollars, since small firms are not comparable to the group of 
interest, and their information is potentially less reliable. The sample includes both listed 
and non-listed firms. However, most of them are non-listed due to the emerging 
                                                          
32 The original dataset contains information from 1995 through 2005. However I decided to use the period 
after the Ecuadorian economy was dollarized, which is 2000, due to the difficulty of dealing with currency 
conversion in the former period in which the economy went through an economic crisis and a 
hyperinflation episode. 
61
conditions of the stock market in Ecuador. Since these two groups are similar in terms of 
corporate control, I do not exclude listed firms from the analysis. 
Firms with incomplete information in more than three periods were excluded, 
including firms younger than three years. Several observations had typographical errors,
and they were detected as having extremely small or big ROAs - over |1|, as well as big 
and inconsistent assets differences over time for a single firm. Firms with many typos 
were excluded from the sample. Additionally, I winsorized the investment variable at the 
top and bottom 1% to avoid the use of abnormal investment rates.  
The ownership section contains information on all the shareholders for each firm 
and the corresponding characteristics (type, nationality) and value of their holding. This 
information is required to organize the ownership structure within each group, both 
horizontal and pyramidal affiliation, including the firm’s ranking in the pyramid. To 
compute the share owned by each type of stockholder (family, off-shore), the 
information is matched with the corresponding family name and off-shore jurisdiction in 
each case. 
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APPENDIX B
GROUP OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES
Figure 1. Pyramidal structure
Figure 2. Horizontal structure
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Figure 3. An actual pyramid in Ecuadorian business groups
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APPENDIX C
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
Assets: Total Assets
Ebidta: Earnings before interest depreciation taxes and amortization. 
Investment: Fixed Assets (t) – Fixed Assets (t-1) + Depreciation (t)
Sales: Total sales
Cash Flow: Operating profits + Depreciation
ROA: Assets /Ebidta
Sales Growth: Sales (t) – Sales (t-1) / Sales (t-1)
Age: 2005 - Year of incorporation
Capital Intensity: Fixed Assets/Wages
Industry Cash Richness: Lag Average (ROA) for the industry – 3 digit SIC
Direct Family share: Percentage of family ownership (Given a family name for each 
group, a shareholder is a family shareholders if she has the family name)
Pyramid share: Percentage of other firms in the same business group’s ownership. 
Total family share: Direct family share + indirect family share (pyramid share)
Off-shore share: Percentage of ownership by shareholders located in off-shore 
jurisdictions.
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APPENDIX D
ENDOGENEITY TESTS
Table D.1
Probability of group affiliation
Variable Group dummy
Age 0.023
(4.31)**
Age Squared -0.0003
(3.22)**
Dummy off-shore holding 0.924
(16.08)**
Log(Assets) 0.211
(12.96)**
Constant -4.537
(21.79)**
Observations 37,899
Pseudo R2 0.179
Wald Chi2(4) 703.44
Prob > chi2 0.00
a. Data Source: Superintendencia de Compañías, Ecuador for the years 2000-2005. 
b. Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
c. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Table D.2
Spearman rank correlation matrix
Group 
indicator
Share
off-shore
Dummy
off-shore Age EBIDTA Assets
Group indicator 1.000
Share off-shore 0.333 1.000
Dummy off-shore 0.324 0.997 1.000
Age 0.130 0.115 0.117 1.000
EBIDTA 0.051 0.067 0.070 0.096 1.000
Assets 0.224 0.241 0.243 0.216 0.392 1.000
Data Source: Superintendencia de Compañías, Ecuador for the years 2000-2005. 
66
Table D.3
Instrumental variables estimation results
Instrument for Group Affiliation Share off-shore holding
Shock 0.871
(1.10)
Group*Shock -0.699
(0.43)
Log(Assets) -314.256
(0.02)
Underidentification test
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 843.89
Chi-sq(3) P-val (0.00)
Weak identification test
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 867.532
Endogeneity test
C statistic 0.000
Chi-sq(1) P-val (0.992)
Observations 37,899
Number of firms 7,180
R-squared 0.0718
a. Data Source: Superintendencia de Compañías, Ecuador for the years 2000-2005. 
b. Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
c. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table D.4
Endogenous switching regression model
Endogenous Switching Regression Model Number of obs = 37,899
Wald chi2(2) = 39.37
Log pseudolikelihood = -570477.45 Prob> chi2 = 0
Coef. Robust Std. Err. Z P>z
Non-group
Shock 1.678 0.467 3.59 0
Log(Assets) -25,492 24,217 -1.05 0.29
Constant 287,396 280,957 1.02 0.31
Group
Shock 1.043 0.244 4.27 0
Log(Assets) -8,505 59,712 -0.14 0.89
Constant 255,646 833,917 0.31 0.76
Selection equation
Dummy Off-shore 1.120 0.053 21.11 0
Age 0.014 0.002 7.72 0
Constant -1.82 0.041 -44.89 0
Other parameters
sigma0 575,506 3,843
sigma1 1,878,407 782
rho0 0.002 0.009 0.17 0.865
rho1 -0.055 0.102 -0.53 0.595
Wald test of indep. eqns. : chi2(2) = 0.31 Prob. > chi2 = 0.8556
a. Data Source: Superintendencia de Compañías, Ecuador for the years 2000-2005. 
b. Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
c. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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APPENDIX E
ADDITIONAL RESULTS ON THE INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS 
HYPOTHESIS
Table E.1
Investment to cash flow sensitivity by category group-affiliation
(dynamic panel) with lagged sales growth as control
Non group Group Pyramid Non-pyramid
Cash Flow 0.145 0.078 0.097 0.05
(10.91)** (2.54)* (2.44)* (1.17)
Age 0.028 0.034 0.067 0.031
(2.72)** (1.73) (1.43) (1.43)
Lag(Sales Growth) -0.007 -0.084 -0.147 0.006
(0.49) (1.30) (1.43) (0.18)
Lag (I/K) 0.006 0.048 0.17 -0.085
(0.60) (0.66) (1.34) (3.01)**
Observations 9626 979 542 437
Number of firms 4154 387 212 175
a. Data Source: Superintendencia de Compañías, Ecuador for the years 2000-2005. 
b. Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
c. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table E.2
Investment to cash flow sensitivity by category group-affiliation
(dynamic panel) with lagged ROA as control
Non group Group Pyramid Horizontal
Cash Flow 0.142 0.068 0.098 0.037
(10.96)** (2.38)* (2.47)* (0.98)
Age -0.002 0.045 0.044 0.047
(0.25) (2.59)** (1.70) (2.29)*
Lag(ROA) 1.215 2.797 -1.723 6.887
(2.01)* (1.94) (1.16) (2.83)**
Lag (I/K) 0.013 0.005 0.08 -0.104
(1.32) (0.08) (0.80) (3.59)**
Observations 10,939 1,168 639 529
Number of firms 4,620 467 254 213
a. Data Source: Superintendencia de Compañías, Ecuador for the years 2000-2005. 
b. Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
c. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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